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would benefit. Such a uniform system could incorporate adequate
safeguards to assure the admitting court of the applicant's qualifica-
dons. The applicant would be required to associate himself with
local counsel, and thus the state's interest in protecting its citizens
from practitioners unfamiliar with local law would not be disre-
garded. Attorneys would know the requirements for admission and
could easily prepare to meet them. Similarly, the elimination of
procedural uncertainties would preclude the possibility of a dient's
being prejudiced because of delay and would promote the rapid
administration of federal justice.
ANDEW R. HUTYERA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - JUVENILE
COURT HEARINGS
In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1966).
Juvenile courts across the country are today in a state of revolu-
tion. The doctrine of parens patriae,' which for years has insulated
juvenile courts from the standards of due process, is being re-
evaluated.' It has been questioned whether the theory of a "mutual
compact,"4 whereby the child accused of a crime gives up his con-
stitutional rights in exchange for protection by the state from the
stigma of a criminal proceeding and for the promise of rehabilita-
tion rather than punishment,' deprives the child of the benefits of
both systems.6
The reasons for this assault upon the insulation of juvenile pro-
ceedings from constitutional protections are dear. The law today
emphasizes individual rights. Due process is not a static concept
- its expansion requires protection of vital rights at every stage in
criminal and civil proceedings.' If one area of law is to be insulated
from due process requirements, there must be an adequate justifica-
clerk of courts for this district. The affiant shall further specify the nature
of the particular transaction or cause for which he has been retained and shall
specify a local counsel admitted to practice before this court with whom the
affiant shall associate himself in the transaction for which he has been retained
and upon whom process may be served. A copy of the affidavit shall forth-
with be served upon the local counsel and the return shall indicate that said
counsel swore or affirmed that he has good cause to believe that the allega-
tions of the affidavit are true. Upon compliance with this rule the nonresi-
dent counsel shall be deemed a member of the bar of this court for all activi-
ties related to the transaction specified in the affidavit.
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tion presented. Thus, juvenile procedure is today under attack be-
cause its parens patriae justification is no longer adequate. The
promise of protection and rehabilitation is not being fulfilled.8 In
light of this realization, state and federal courts are extending con-
stitutional safeguards to juveniles. To what degree and in what
manner of application, however, are still speculative questions to
which a recent decision offers some interesting and significant an-
swers.
In In re WinburnP a minor was charged in juvenile court under
a delinquency petition with violation of the Wisconsin first-degree
murder statute, the fact that he had committed the act being undis-
puted. A court-ordered psychiatric examination resulted in the de-
I Under this theory the special interest of the state in protecting and rehabilitating
its children is considered so controlling, and so well effectuated, that most constitu-
tional safeguards are considered unnecessary. B1son, Juvenile Courts & Due Process,
in JUSTICE FOR THE CHmu 95 (Rosenheim ed. 1962). Thus, constitutional guaran-
tees respecting defendants in criminal cases "do not apply [in juvenile proceedings]."
43 C.J.S. Infants § 99, at 240 (1945).
2 See Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conm 70, 121 At. 678 (1923); In re Santillanes, 47 N.MI
140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
8 See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49 (1962); Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961); It re Poff,
135 1. Sump. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
4 Ketcham, The Unfulfiled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, in JuSTI cE
FOR THE CHILD 22, 25 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
5Ibid.
0 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 546 (1966).
7 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d
256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966).
8 See In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952),
wherein it is stated:
W]hile the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be
a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, never-
theless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge
to credulity and doing violence to reason. Courts cannot and will not shut
their eyes and ears to everyday contemporary happenings.
It is common knowlege that such an adjudication when based upon a
charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon the
character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such minor. Let
him attempt to enter the armed services of his country or obtain a position of
honor and trust and he is immediately confronted with his juvenile court rec-
ord. And further, as in this case, the minor is taken from his family, de-
prived of his liberty and confined in a state institution. True, the design of
the Juvenile Court Act is intended to be salutary, and every effort should be
made to further its legitimate purpose, but never should it be made an in-
strument for the denial to a minor of a constitutional right or of a guarantee
afforded by law to an adult. Id. at 789-90, 241 P.2d at 633.
See also Antieau, Constitutional Rights in .Juvenile Courts, 46 CORMELL L.Q. 387
(1961).
9 145 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1966).
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termination that the minor was insane at the time of the murder,
and the court found him not guilty by reason of insanity, dismissing
the delinquency petition on its merits, and ordered him committed
to an institution for treatment."0 The state supreme court affirmed
this finding," rejecting the state's contention that under the theory
of parens patriae the criminal defense of insanity is not permissible
in a noncriminal juvenile hearing.'
The court, construing Kent v. United States,'8 first stated that
precedent required that a juvenile hearing meet the essentials of
due process and fair treatment. 4 Although the theory of juvenile
proceedings is good - rehabilitation and treatment in the best in-
terests of the child through individualized justice - retribution in
fact plays a role. Because the juvenile is often incarcerated to pro-
tect society, juvenile proceedings may "smack of 'crime and punish-
ment."" 5  Social stigma may attach to a child adjudicated a delin-
quent, and a minor may be sent to an adult institution. At this
point, said the court, the distinction between the juvenile and the
criminal process breaks down, and the need for essential due process
protections becomes acute. 6
Because the determination of delinquency cannot occur when a
child's act is accidental, the same distinction must be drawn between
acts of the sane and the insane to insure maximum fairness to the
child. "A petition based on a violation that requires criminal in-
tent cannot result in a finding of delinquency when... because of
insanity, there was a failure to form the requisite intent."'7  Thus,
permitting the defense of insanity goes to the heart of the guilt-
determining process. The court added that its decision is fully con-
sonant with both the essentials of due process requirement enunci-
ated in Kent and the juvenile court philosophy. 8
In order to appreciate the impact of Winburn upon the growing
10 Id. at 179-80.
11 ld. at 180.
12 Brief for Respondent, pp. 12-13, In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1966).
13 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
14In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Wis. 1966).
1 Ibid.
'Old. at 183.
1Tid. at 184.
's The best interests of both the child and society are served by committing him to
a mental institution. Dismissal of the delinquency petition on the merits is a bar to
future criminal prosecution should the child later regain his sanity. Thus the protec-
tion of parens patriae has been afforded to the child, and he has received fundamentally
fair treatment within the juvenile process. Id. at 185.
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extension of constitutional rights to juveniles, it will be helpful to
examine the types of cases in which this extension is occurring and
the constitutional theories under which the courts are proceeding.
Generally, constitutional rights have been granted to juveniles
in juvenile proceedings wherein the minor is charged with a crime'9
and in juvenile hearings held to determine waiver of the minor to
a criminal court to be tried there as an adult.2" The assault upon
parens patriae is most pertinent in the former instance, for where
a child is charged with a crime and is subject to possible criminal
sanctions, although they be called juvenile remedies, the claim that
he is not entitled to adult constitutional protections merely because
the court procedures are different becomes indefensible."' "May a
child be deprived of his liberty and incarcerated in an institution
until he reaches the age of twenty-one merely by changing the name
of the offense from unauthorized use of a motor vehicle to juvenile
delinquency?""2  Thus, the courts have found that parens patriae
is not adequate justification for denying the minor constitutional
fairness by changing the name of the offense, where its substance
remains the same, 3 or by changing the name of the proceedings
from criminal to juvenile, where the sanctions are in fact the same'
and where the guilt-determining process is identical. 5
Cases involving waiver of the minor to criminal court have pro-
duced the most liberal extension of constitutional rights," but they
must be distinguished by the overlapping of jurisdiction between
the juvenile and criminal courts. Because the minor may, as a re-
sult of waiver, move from a protected noncriminal to an unpro-
19 Accord, United States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1967); Shioutakon v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cit. 1956); In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C.
1955); In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1966).
2 0 Accord, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Black v. United States, 355
F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cit. 1964);
Hailing v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cit. 1961); United States v. Dickerson,
168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
2 1 Accord, In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
22 Id. at 226.
23 Ibid.
24 See id. at 227; In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Wis. 1966).
25 See In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.D.C. 1955); Quick, Constitutional
Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 How. L.J. 76 (1966), pointing out that due to the
different weight given evidence in criminal and juvenile proceedings, the minor may
be sentenced on proof that would fail to sustain a conviction in criminal court. Id.
at 108.
26 See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Black v. United States, 355
F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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tected criminal status, the question becomes that of determining the
point at which the juvenile becomes subject to the "regular proce-
dures" of the criminal process." At this "critically important"
point," constitutional rights attach." Thus, not only must the ju-
venile be notified of his right to counsel prior to the waiver hear-
ing 0 but also he must be represented by counsel at the hearing. 1
Kent v. United States2 carried this due process requirement a
step further and held that the "essentials of due process and fair
treatment" require procedural regularity in the waiver hearing to
the extent that a full investigation must be held in which the juve-
nile court rules on all of counsel's motions, for example, a motion
for a psychiatric examination or a motion to see the minor's juvenile
record." Failure to do so was held tantamount to a denial of coun-
sel and, hence, denial of due process."' Thus, in waiver cases, where
juvenile and criminal jurisdiction and procedure may overlap, the
minor will receive the full protection of criminal guarantees.
With these distinctions in mind, Winburn,5 in applying the
standard presented in Kent"8 to its own fact situation, has carried
certain criminal guarantees into the insulated delinquency hearing
where there is no overlapping of juvenile and criminal jurisdiction
such as exists in the waiver situation. Because Kent rested not upon
a specific interpretation of the juvenile court statute with reference
to waiver," but upon objective requirements of constitutional due
process, its broad language was interpreted in Winburn as applica-
2 7 Accord, Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
2 8 Accord, Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
2 9 Thus, hearsay, admissible in juvenile hearings, State v. Shardell, 107 Ohio App.
338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (1958), is inadmissible when the minor is tried in criminal court.
A confession made before a juvenile court cannot be used in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (confession obtained by coer-
don), nor may any other admission made by the minor prior to waiver be used. Har-
ling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). But see Harrison v. United
States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (written confession excluded, but oral confession
admissible in subsequent criminal prosecution).
80 Accord, Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
81 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956), holding that
counsel was necessary to make the statutory right to be heard fully meaningful. If the
minor is indigent, the court must provide counsel. Id. at 669, 670.
32 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
83Id. at 546-61.
34 Id. at 561.
35 In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1966).
86 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
3 7 Compare Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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ble to any juvenile hearing.8" This demonstrates that, as the con-
cept of due process in juvenile court expands, the type of fact situa-
tion in which minors are afforded constitutional protections also
expands.39
Various theories have been utilized in the extension of constitu-
tional rights to juveniles, but at the heart of each lies a basic dissat-
isfaction with the performance of the theory of parens patriae.
That a juvenile is entitled to fundamental fairness was interpreted
in Pee v. United States4" to mean the right to fair treatment, not
the right to the "direct application of the clauses of the Constitution
which in terms apply to criminal cases."41  This approach to fum-
damental fairness as a substantive element inherent in the parens
patriae doctrine has been affirmed by those who would urge that,
while principles of fundamental fairness should control in deter-
mining what is due process for the child, it must be done within the
statutory scheme and that for this reason juvenile proceedings must
be insulated from adult procedure.42 To expand constitutional
rights under this theory, it has been held that the legislative intent
in creating a juvenile court system was to enlarge the safeguards
which juveniles as citizens have, not to bar their application.43
The cases granting right to counsel in a juvenile hearing have
used the penumbral rights theory to extend greater due process pro-
tection to juveniles, finding counsel necessary to make fully mean-
ingful the right to be heard44 and the right to a full investigation
prior to waiver.45 However, cases advancing this theory have dealt
with waiver, where the primary constitutional rights may be said to
arise from potential criminal status and jurisdiction and are thus
distinguishable.
38 See In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1966).
39 See United States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43 (2d Cit. 1967); In re Carlo, 35 U.S.
WEEK 2322 (N.J. Nov. 21, 1966).
40274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cit. 1959) (granting criminal protections after waiver).
411d. at 559.
42 Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See Paulsen,
Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L REV. 547 (1957), where the author
asserts that fundamental fairness must be kept within the beneficial context of the
parens patriae doctrine. Any constitutional rights which would conflict with the de-
sired end of treatment and rehabilitation, such as granting a juvenile the privilege
against self-incrimination, would not be desireable. Id. at 550, 561.
43 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
44 Accord, Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
45 Accord, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See also Black v. United
States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Watldns v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (both discussing the procedural requirements of a full investigation prior
to a valid waiver).
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The loss-of-liberty theory offers perhaps the best justification
for the extension of constitutional rights to juveniles, for it abro-
gates the parens patriae doctrine and serves as a vehicle to carry
equal protection of the laws to the minor. "[Flairness and justice
certainly recognize that a child has the right not to be a ward of the
State, not to be committed to a reformatory, not to be deprived of
his liberty, if he is innocent."4 That loss of liberty may follow any
fact finding determination in juvenile court4" is a reality not easily
defensible by virtue of a mere difference in the labelling of judicial
systems. Therefore, it has been held that where in a juvenile hear-
ing loss of liberty is threatened, the right to counsel exists, regard-
less of the seriousness of the charge, for "'the Constitution draws no
distinction between loss of liberty for a short period and such loss
for a long one."48 By analogy, it could be said that in reality today
there is little distinction between incarceration in a juvenile deten-
tion or correction home and incarceration in an adult penal institu-
tion.49  And the social stigma of juvenile delinquency is not negli-
gible."0
The revolution in the juvenile court system is well under way.
Presently, the United States Supreme Court is faced with deciding
whether the federal constitution applies to state juvenile courts. 1
That decision will most probably give federal approval to the criti-
cisms raised and the solutions offered in such cases as In re Win-
burn.52 In permitting constitutional protections within the juve-
nile hearing, the court in Winburn cast off the tyranny of labels
insulating the juvenile court and permitted the true nature of the
hearing to determine what due process required for the child. Rec-
ognizing that it is not the purpose of the parens patriae doctrine
which has failed but rather the means adopted in the name of indi-
vidualized justice for the child,8 Winburn indicates that the best
46 Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 613, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954) (dissenting opin-
ion).
4 7 
It is stil unsettled whether the defense of double jeopardy may bar a criminal
trial subsequent to a juvenile hearing in which the minor was found not guilty. See
United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C.
Cir. 1959).
4 8 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
49 Cf. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573
(1966) (writ of habeas corpus because of incarceration in mental institution).
50 See note 8 supra.
51 See Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), cert granted, 87
Sup. Ct. 498 (1966).
52 145 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1966).
58 Accord, Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, in
JUSTI cE FOR THE CHILD 22 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
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